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HOMICIDE AND HISTORY 
Edward Ayers 
OMICIDE HAS BECOME the leading cause of death 
among black youths in the United States. The killings 
~~----~ announced every day on the television news or the metro 
pages of newspapers make it seem that things have always been this 
way, that they can be no different. Professionals as well as the public 
have come to view the violence as a disease, an epidemic for which no 
cure seems possible. Criminologists have run the numbers on black 
homicide through their computers over and over again to find the key 
to the murders. Debates rage between those who argue for a distinct 
subculture of violence and those who stress inequality and injustice. 
The literature on black homicide has become enormous and enormously 
complicated. 1 
What could a humanist-in my case, a historian-hope to add to 
this discussion, a discussion pursued with such energy and sophistica-
tion by specialists in current problems? Not an easy solution, certainly, 
for humanists tend to complicate things rather than clarify, to add reser-
vations rather than certainty. In the instance of violence among black 
Americans, though, maybe that is what we need. Perhaps a humanist 
can help provide disrance from a problem that seems so overwhelming. 
And with that distance, that perspective, the problem may look some-
what different if no less tragic and important. 
We can get beyond the limits of our own experience and casual 
impressions by looking both at other times and at other places. A his-
torical perspective offers a surprise at the very beginning: the Western 
world, contrary to the sense of so many people today, used to be a far 
more violent place than it is now. Medieval and early modern Europe 
were filled with assaults, rapes, and murder, with the violence becom-
ing even more common in the eighteenth century. The Western world 
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began to become less violent only in the mid-nineteenth century. 
People contained in towns, factories, and schools, people raised to hold 
violent impulses in check and punished if they did not, were less likely 
than rural folk to turn to violence. Police became much stronger, 
expectations about public safety more demanding, incarceration rates 
higher. These trends have grown much more pronounced over the 
course of the twentieth century and show no signs of abating. To some 
extent, then, our sense of increased violence is a product of heightened 
. 2 
expectations. 
There is another reason violence seems more threatening today 
than in the relatively recent past. For centuries, crime was kept out of 
sight. The "criminal classes" were segregated from the rest of society, 
walled out of cities, run out of town kept on the other side of the tracks. 
Newspapers, police, and courts paid relatively little attention to crimes 
among the poor, who often had to prosecute cases themselves if they 
wanted any redress against violence they suffered. Today, things are dif-
ferent: television news thrives on scenes of flashing lights, distraught 
parents, and bloody sidewalks. Police continually patrol parts of town 
they used to ignore. Modern transportation permits members of the 
"dangerous classes" to range more widely than before. As a result, the 
general population is far more aware of violence now than in the past. 
Not that the violence is new. Since its beginnings, the United 
States has seen bloody conflicts between whites and Native Americans, 
between employers and workers, between North and South, and 
between factions of urban rioters. It has also experienced three major 
waves of homicide since the middle of the last century. The first one 
came in the wake of the Civil War, in the late 1860s and early 1870s. 
Such violence has erupted in almost all places following wars, as the 
legitimized violence of wartime bleeds over into the peace. The next 
wave of homicide was less predictable, for it swept the United States 
early in this century-beginning about 1905 and building steadily 
until the early 1930s. The causes of this surge in homicide are obscure. 
It may have had something to do with increased immigration from 
Europe, with prohibition, or with the growth of cities. In any case, 
even though Americans tend to think of the early twentieth century as 
the good old days, the United States registered rates of homicide in the 
early 1930s as high as those of the late twentieth century. 
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Those who want to recall a relatively peaceful era in American his-
tory would do well to look in a somewhat unexpected place: the Great 
Depression, World War II, and the Cold War. Even as hunger, labor 
strife, and war mobilization convulsed the nation, homicide declined. 
The rate, in fact, declined steadily until about 1960. American society 
became more peaceful, ironically, as the world became more dangerous, 
precisely because our armed forces absorbed enormous numbers of 
young men, the group in almost every society that accounts for the 
great bulk of violence. These low rates of homicide in the mid-twenti-
eth century should make us wary of easy notions about the sources of 
crime. Poverty, alone, did not necessarily create violence, and neither 
did the social dislocation that came during the largest migration of 
African Americans from the South to the North. Violence is not an 
inevitable by-product of modern urban society. Crime is not the simple 
thing it sometimes seems to be in everyday life, not simply the story of 
individual character or individual failure, but the complex product of 
shifting circumstances. 
Some circumstances must have changed in the mid-1960s, then, 
for the number of murders began to skyrocket and rose steeply through-
out the 1970s. After a shallow dip, the rate rose again in the early 
1980s, then after a pause in the late eighties, has begun to mount once 
more in the early 1990s. It is this wave of the last twenty-five years 
that has occasioned so much commentary, so much worry. It has been 
blamed on everything from the social programs of Kennedy and 
Johnson to television to the proliferation of handguns to drugs to the 
decline of the two-parent household. We cannot untangle the causation 
here, but perhaps we can gain some long-term perspective about its ori-
gins, about the larger contexts in which the more immediate conditions 
for violence have flourished. 
It is helpful, and surprising, first of all, to realize that the escala-
tion of homicide in the 1960s occurred not only in the United States 
but in virtually all European countries as well. The explanation seems 
to lie in the unusually large generation born in the baby boom after 
World War II, its males entering the ages between 15 and 24 in the 
1960s and early 1970s. An increase in that male age cohort commonly 
brings an increase of crime along with it. Criminologists, in fact, pre-
dicted, and saw, a brief decline in the homicide rates in the late 1980s 
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as the relatively small generation born in the 1960s came of age. 
Unfortunately, the large post-World War II generation will likely be 
echoed in the crime rates of the 1990s as their children enter the age 
when they are most likely to commit violent acts.3 
If comparisons that show the United States is not alone in its 
crime wave are comforting, however, other comparisons are less so: 
about ten of every one hundred thousand Americans are killed by homi-
cide each year, a rate about ten times that of other industrialized coun-
tries such as England, France, Japan, and Germany. An American is 
killed every twenty-two minutes. These are the numbers that we read 
about each year when the government releases its latest statistics, the 
numbers that confirm our belief that we are the most violent developed 
nation on earth. Again, though, there is more to the picture. The 
homicide rate in the United States falls considerably below that of some 
other countries. Latin American nations such as Colombia or Mexico 
have rates more than double that of North America, and other countries 
in the Caribbean, North Africa, and the Middle East are also more vio-
lent than we are. Measuring ourselves against relatively homogenous 
industrialized countries may not do justice to the degree of difficulty 
Americans face, creating false expectations and subsequent despair. 
It may well be, international examples suggest, that when it 
comes to violence the most important aspect of a nation is not merely 
its degree of industrial development, but rather its degree of hetero-
geneity, its ethnic diversity. Comparative studies show that, through-
out the world, the people most likely to commit homicide are young 
males who belong to minorities of ethnicity or religion. Groups perse-
cuted or ignored by the dominant society seem to breed violence among 
themselves. The aggression grows out of displaced anger, a loss of faith 
in the law, poverty, and discrimination. 
The place to start, then, in understanding American violence is to 
recognize the centrality of the connection between ethnicity and homi-
cide, to understand that the situation of the United States is not 
unique. Much black violence grows out of blacks' perception that they 
are outside the concerns and protection afforded other Americans. And 
that feeling that they must take matters into their own hands is a cata-
lyst for violence, just as it is in other parts of the world. 
The roots of black estrangement run deep. As in all things 
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African American, we have to start in the South. Despite the horrors of 
slavery, newly freed African Americans proved eager to participate in 
the American legal system. Soon after freedom, though, blacks discov-
ered that the law in which they had placed so much faith was not 
intended for their benefit. They were excluded from juries, segregated 
in courthouses, even made to swear on Bibles reserved for black witness-
es. Blacks began to refer to the "white man's court," to recognize that it 
held no justice for them. Police often neglected black crimes against 
other blacks; as the saying went, "When a nigger kills a white man, 
that's murder. If a white man kills a nigger, that's justifiable homicide. 
If a nigger kills another nigger, that's one less nigger." Newspapers 
largely ignored black-on-black violence. Southern prisons became 
filled with blacks prosecuted for minor offenses, and the convicts were 
leased out to the highest bidders, in whose camps they died in 
appalling numbers. 
White Southerners, who had long bragged of the docility of their 
slaves, began to worry that violence among blacks was becoming ram-
pant in the post-Reconstruction era. White injustice, some warned, 
was creating a disregard for the law among black people; former con-
victs coming out of the South's prison camps were treated as heroes by 
some African Americans. White Southerners themselves lost faith in the 
efficacy of their own legal system and began to lynch black men by the 
hundreds each year in the late nineteenth century, taking trial and pun-
ishment into their own hands. Whites blamed the torrent of lynching 
on a new generation of young black men born since emancipation who 
hated whites and did not fear the law. 
Commentators of both races observed that black men increasingly 
fought among themselves. African American men seemed especially 
sensitive to any verbal slight from another black man, especially quick 
to fight or kill when they felt their honor had been impugned. In a 
place where the law offered no protection, African-American men felt 
they had no choice but to settle conflicts themselves. In a place where 
their dignity was constantly assaulted, young black men demanded the 
respect that grows out of physical domination and intimidation. 
This violence of honor has shown remarkable longevity. In 
Southern cities in the 1930s and 1940s, for example, nine out of ten 
black homicide victims were killed in disputes over women, gambling, 
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and insults. It is mainly because of the continued existence and volatil-
ity of honor-related violence that the South has witnessed such high 
homicide rates throughout its history and why high homicide rates 
have accompanied Southerners of both races when they have moved to 
the North and West. The legal situation in cities outside the South 
often proved not to be very different from what they had left. Police 
routinely ignored black districts, where people were left to fend for 
themselves. De facto segregation kept much black violence beyond the 
view of whites. ' 
For awhile, the economic situation in the North offered some 
hope. Black migrants benefitted from jobs in defense and other indus-
try in the 1940s and 1950s, jobs newly opened to them by federal anti-
discrimination legislation enacted during World War II. Black unem-
ployment reached all-time lows in the mid-1950s. Middle-class neigh-
borhoods developed, as African-American businesses, schools, and orga-
nizations thrived. Just when it seemed that blacks would gain a 
foothold in the cities of the North, urban economies began to change. 
Even as black Americans continued to migrate from the countryside in 
hopes of finding manufacturing jobs, those jobs began to disappear 
from the cities, either because the factories moved to cheaper places or 
because the factories required workers with higher levels of education 
than was available to most blacks. Jobs for domestic and unskilled 
labor waned, lessening the chances for recent migrants to win a place in 
the economy. The cities fell into a long and painful decline. Whites, 
along with many blacks who had the resources to do so, fled the cities 
for the suburbs, leaving those without jobs trapped in the cities. Some 
criminologists have found that the best indicator of growing crime in 
America's cities is, surprisingly enough, the rate of suburbanization. 
Escape for some means hopelessness for others. 
It is this decline of the urban economy that helps account for what 
is for many people the most frightening aspect of crime in present-day 
America: the growing prevalence of armed robbery and drug-related 
homicide. Armed robbery was not a common crime in the nineteenth 
century, but today it accounts for a growing proportion of crime-and 
the crime in which the disproportion of blacks is the largest. While 
alcohol has always been related to crimes of violence, the growth of the 
drug trade since the 1960s has fueled crime to an unprecedented 
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degree. The introduction of crack in 1983 made an already dangerous 
situation even more so. It is not merely that drug users commit crimes 
while high; in fact, crimes of violence seem to have become more calcu-
lating than they were before, directed more at material ends. As the 
legitimate economy has dried up and died in the places where many 
black Americans live, the illegitimate economy seems to offer at least a 
hope of immediate gain. 
In more recent decades, the violence of honor has begun to meld 
with a violence of acquisition. Drug-related robberies and assassina-
tions have grown as young black men turn to the alternative, illicit, 
economy for money and identity. In the past, the great majority of 
homicides occurred between people who knew one another; today, more 
and more killings involve strangers. To a certain extent, this instru-
mental violence has displaced the older style of violence triggered by 
sexual jealousy, insults, and gambling. On the other hand, the violence 
of honor mixes easily with the violence of gain. Drugs, desperation, 
and honor have made for a volatile combination, as people who feel they 
have little to live for confront escalating assaults on their dignity. 
Violence triggered by such a wide array of causes has come to seem 
more random and meaningless than before as it lashes out at anyone 
who, even temporarily, embodies oppression or opposition. 
Frighteningly, too, as violence is directed more at strangers than at 
acquaintances, police find it harder to prosecute: as recently as twenty-
five years ago, nine out of ten murders were solved, but today only 
seven in ten reach such a conclusion. 
The United States, then, is so worried about black criminal vio-
lence now because measurable rates are at a historically high level, 
because a violence of anger is merging with a violence of gain, and 
because violence is becoming more visible to people outside the poorest 
neighborhoods. All these causes are rooted in long-term changes in 
demography, the economy, and residential patterns. 
The major continuity is inequality. Poverty alone, we have seen, 
need not produce violence. The time when Americans were poorest, in 
the 1930s, saw the rates of homicide plummet, while the increase of 
violence in the 1960s occurred during a time when the economy was 
booming, when television carried images of prosperity into the despair-
ing homes of a swelling young black population. Economic inequality, 
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increasing though it is, may not be the most damaging kind. 
Inequality in justice, enduring for generations, has eroded faith in the 
law and its representatives, reduced the rewards for restraint. Crimes 
are committed by individuals with responsibility for their actions, not 
by social forces. But we should not forget that every individual life 
takes shape within cycles, processes, and histories that stretch far 
beyond its own time. 
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